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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy exemplifies the defining tenet of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and ending wars—though how this fits with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative echoed this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Mixed Signals

This shift is significant, but analysts note it is early to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Apathy and Friction

Unlike his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has broken out with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Selective Intervention

An analogous tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

An Echo of Other Powers

Experts describe the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.